Tackling Europe’s crisis legacy: a comprehensive strategy for bad loans and debt restructuring. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue No. 11 2017 by Demertzis, Maria & Lehmann, Alexander
Maria Demertzis (maria.
demertzis@bruegel.org) is 
Deputy Director of Bruegel
Alex Lehmann (alexander.
lehmann@bruegel.org) is 
a Non-resident Fellow at 
Bruegel
The authors are grateful 
for comments from Dirk 
Schoenmaker, Nicolas Véron 
and Guntram Wolff. This 
paper benefitted immensely 
from discussions at the 
Bruegel conference on NPLs 
and debt restructuring on 3 
February 2017. Justine Feliu 
provided valuable research 
assistance.
Executive summary
Eight years after the start of Europe’s financial crisis, the legacy of non-performing loans 
and excessive private debt remains a key obstacle to the recovery of bank credit and invest-
ment. 
We argue that efforts to reduce and remove NPLs from the balance sheets of creditors 
must simultaneously remove excess debt from the balance sheets of debtors. This is the only 
way to ensure that bank balance sheets are restored to health sustainably, and that both sup-
ply and demand for new credit revive. 
A comprehensive strategy to tackle legacy assets should include national debt reduc-
tion strategies that guide bank NPL reduction targets, strengthen frameworks for restructuring 
and insolvency, simplify the engagement of specialist investors within the capital markets 
union and, crucially, create a blueprint for national asset management companies. 
There is a need to strengthen policies in four key areas:
First and foremost, recapitalise banks to enable them to provision distressed loans 
adequately, and then actively participate in restructuring or writing off unviable loans. 
Second, encourage further legal reform that is also supported by adequate re-
structuring capacity within the banks and elsewhere in the private sector, including by 
attracting specialist investors. 
Third, create a tax regime and flexibility in revenue management that encourages the 
public sector to participate in debt restructuring. 
Finally, establish asset management companies that can overcome the various 
market failures in terms of removing distressed assets from banks’ balance sheets. 
NPLs are concentrated in particular countries but are a problem for the entire euro-area 
banking system given the many financial and real spillovers across the currency area. There is 
a clear need for national reforms that create a more supportive environment for debt restruc-
turing and deleveraging. But many policies will also need to be coordinated within the euro 
area, and possibly within the single EU capital market.
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Introduction
At a current value in excess of €1 trillion, non-performing loans (NPLs) have undermined the 
recovery in credit and economic growth in the EU since the 2009 financial crisis (Figure 1 and 
European Commission, 2017). In terms of bank regulation and supervision, the response was 
initially slow, though is now more decisive. Since 2013, the EU has had uniform standards 
for bank asset quality, and as of 2017 key euro-area banks will be forced to set targets for NPL 
reduction and to improve operational capacity to manage the workout (ECB, 2017). 
But it is often overlooked that loan delinquency is a symptom of debt distress in the pri-
vate sector. And debt in excess of sustainable levels is even more widespread than NPL figures 
would suggest. At least eight countries within the currency bloc suffer from excess private 
debt on a scale that could potentially undermine their ability to recover sustainably. 
This should be a concern for policymakers, including bank supervisors. Even loans that 
are so far performing might be held by companies that are not economically viable or house-
holds that are in distress. From 2018, the EU’s new accounting standards will force banks 
to adopt a forward-looking assessment of borrowers’ financial health. The impact of future 
write-offs and the benefits of early and well-coordinated debt restructuring on the current 
earnings and capital position will be much more apparent. 
In most euro-area countries debt restructuring can be a market-driven process. Legal 
frameworks for restructuring and insolvency have been reformed, and capacity in judicial 
systems and local insolvency professions is improving. 
However, at least four euro-area countries combine a toxic mix of excessive NPL levels, 
stagnant growth and persistent excess debt: Greece and Cyprus for households and compa-
nies, Portugal among large enterprises in particular, and above all Italy, with almost 30 per-
cent of the total euro-area NPL stock. For these countries, gradualism would be counterpro-
ductive because protracted deleveraging is costly and capital remains tied up in businesses 
with unsustainable debt. Some enterprises might return to health following a comprehensive 
financial and operational restructuring, others will ultimately require partial or full liquida-
tion. In these economies national frameworks and institutions need to be reformed further, 
and EU and euro area policies need to be strengthened to support comprehensive balance 
sheet restructuring.  
Figure 1: Gross non-performing debt instruments in the EU, % of total gross debt 
instruments
Source: ECB. Note: peak year to 2016 Q2.
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In this Policy Contribution we describe the supply and demand sides of debt. We then 
take stock of the process of private debt deleveraging in Europe and identify the institutional 
reforms made by countries that underwent systemic debt resolutions successfully in the past. 
Given the many financial real spillovers within the currency area, there is a case for policy 
coordination at the euro-area level and, in more focused areas, in the capital markets union. 
1 Private debt: a problem with two sides 
World Bank (2011)1 demonstrated how debt has become more important for the functioning 
of modern economies over the last 20 to 30 years. More and more people and firms use debt 
to finance growth. However, and as World Bank (2011) emphasises, the procedures followed 
to resolve debts, when borrowers default, have not adapted to match the increased preva-
lence of debt. As a result, the inability to resolve debts as they become unproductive has led to 
the accumulation of high stocks of private debt. Europe is not different in this respect. Figure 
2 shows that it is the levels of private debt (not fiscal debts) that remain high, and possibly too 
high.
Figure 2: Private sector (households and non-financial corporates) debt, % of GDP
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat, Irish National Central Bank Statistics. Note: Private debt data for Ireland is based on central bank statis-
tics (CCB indicators), which are based on national bank credit data, thereby excluding the debts of foreign affiliates.  
The exact level at which indebtedness distorts growth remains unclear. The European 
Commission’s Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) uses a threshold of 113 percent of 
GDP as a signal for deeper investigation of private indebtedness. In a separate study (Euro-
pean Commission, 2013) that compared private (household and firm) debt levels to historical 
positions, the Commission estimated deleveraging needs of over 30 percent of GDP in Greece, 
Cyprus and Spain and about 20 percent for Dutch households.
But the range of estimates of such thresholds is wide and disputed. Cecchetti et al (2011) 
found that corporate and household debt in excess, respectively, of 90 and 85 percent of GDP 
is detrimental for growth. Arcand et al (2011) found that even private debt at 100 percent of 
1 World Bank (2011) refers to personal insolvency.
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GDP exerts a significant drag on growth. Caution therefore is important when attempting to 
categorise a level of private debt as excessive. 
1.1 The two effects of excessive debt
Irrespective of whether we know the exact point at which debt becomes excessive, we can 
recognise two ways in which excessive debt has detrimental effects on the economy. 
The first impacts the supply of credit. Excessive debts are typically non-performing. When 
creditors have a level of NPLs on their balance sheet, they do not issue new credit, thus put-
ting a cap on the credit supplied to the economy. There are several channels through which 
NPLs can affect creditors. NPLs erode bank earnings because of the higher risk weights in 
calculating capital costs, provisioning and diminished returns on delinquent assets. European 
Central Bank simulations suggest that simply replacing existing NPLs with sound exposures 
would lift return on equity in the most affected countries by several percentage points (Con-
stâncio, 2017). Higher capital requirements for NPLs also tie up banks’ resources and crowd 
out new credit. This similarly applies to human resources given that monitoring and man-
agement of NPLs requires more effort and ties up specific skills that are usually scarce within 
banks. Finally, high NPLs are a source of uncertainty leading to higher costs of funding and 
possible greater risk aversion by investors and depositors (Diwan and Rodrik, 1992). 
Figure 1 showed current NPL levels in the EU compared to peak levels. While a number 
of countries have made progress in removing NPLs from bank balance sheets, a number of 
others clearly have not. The eight euro-area countries with the highest NPL ratios account for 
just under 70 percent of the NPL stock in the currency area. These eight ‘high-NPL’ countries 
also have elevated private debt ratios, in particular in relation to businesses. Interestingly, 
however, countries like Denmark and the Netherlands, which have low NPL levels, also had 
private debt in excess of 200 percent of GDP at the peak.
Excessive debt also suppresses the demand for new credit. This second effect, known as 
the debt overhang, has been less prominent in the European discussion. Debt overhang is 
a situation in which high debt levels act as a disincentive to new investment (Myers, 1977). 
When a firm has debts that create a non-trivial probability of defaulting, it becomes reluc-
tant to demand more credit to finance new investments. This is irrespective of whether new 
investments would generate sufficient profits to finance themselves. The existing stock of 
debt weighs in on firms’ economic decisions because any new profits will go to service old 
creditors first, and will only thereafter accrue to equity holders. This ‘tax’ on new investment 
distorts the willingness to invest and to grow out of debt. This phenomenon is the same for 
firms, households and countries, as pointed out by Krugman (1988). 
This effect is difficult to measure directly, but can be identified in different ways. Compa-
nies that are highly leveraged find it difficult to take advantage of an improvement in demand, 
and may even continue to de-lever as a recovery takes hold (IMF, 2015a). In Europe, it is 
estimated that the debt overhang explains about a third of the decline in investment observed 
during the crisis (Ozcan et al, 2015). It is likely that the number of firms originally affected by 
this distortion is significant, making it a systemic obstacle to recovery2. 
1.2 Alternative paths to debt adjustment
Our main observation is that while there has been progress in removing NPLs from bank bal-
ance sheets, the reduction in total private indebtedness is still at an early stage. Total private 
debt in the EU (Figure 2) remains at an unweighted average of almost 150 percent of GDP. 
Removing NPLs from bank balance sheets remains necessary, though it does not imply a one-
to-one reduction in private debt. For loan delinquency to be reduced sustainably, debt also 
2 Jordà et al (2013). There are also other arguments relevant in this respect. Acharya et al (2016) argued that the 
ECB’s early unorthodox instruments stimulated lending by banks but that this lending was primarily directed to 
existing, rather than new, clients and these borrowers exhibited poor credit quality. What they characterise as 
‘zombie lending’ sustained firms with non-viable debt burdens and further distorted markets.
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needs to be brought down to sustainable levels. 
A significant obstacle to this adjustment has been the EU’s anaemic growth and almost 
zero inflation, at least until recently. Because the real value of debt does not adjust, it is the 
nominal value of debt that needs to come down. In principle, there are two alternative paths 
to such an adjustment: 
• Deleveraging, as debtors put aside resources to repay existing debt. This however, 
depresses growth and investment as lenders rebuild liquidity in the absence of a more 
comprehensive improvement in the debt situation. Repressing investment and consump-
tion also has considerable and long-lasting implications for income – a result of so-called 
hysteresis effects that last beyond any adjustment period, because of impacts on skills, 
employment and productivity given the depressed path of capital accumulation. Europe-
an Commission estimates point to a permanent reduction in GDP of almost one percent-
age point for every ten-percentage point reduction in the private debt ratio (Pontuch, 
2014).
• Re-structuring and/or write-downs. This form of adjustment would involve wide-rang-
ing modification of loan terms to recognise the value loss relative to the original terms in 
credit contracts, and to share this value loss between creditors and equity holders. In most 
of the eight euro-area countries with high NPLs, balance sheet restructuring has been 
slow. This is mostly because of coordination problems, market failures in the pricing of 
claims and the lack of bank capital that is needed once banks absorb losses. Only a few 
countries have engaged in more systemic restructuring, through recapitalisation and con-
solidation of the banking sector, guarantees or separation of delinquent loans from bank 
balance sheets (we review some case studies in section 2). 
1.3 A framework for thinking about bad debt
For levels of private debts to fall meaningfully, financial restructuring in debt-distressed 
borrowers needs to become more prominent. The emphasis needs to be on rescuing what is 
productive through restructuring and writing off what is non-productive as quickly as pos-
sible. This principle would in our view allow sufficient consideration to be given to restoring 
financial viability of debtors, and would be a crucial complement to the process of NPL reso-
lution that is already underway. 
A guiding principle for resolving NPLs should that viable debt remains serviced, while 
non-viable debt gets resolved. But this is not the same as resolving non-performing debt while 
holding on to performing debt. It helps therefore to apply two criteria when categorising 
loans: borrower viability and ability to service3. Performing loans are those being serviced in 
line with the original contractual loan terms. Viable loans are those extended to borrowers 
whose future stream of profits will exceed scheduled debt service obligations.
With these criteria, loans can be divided into four categories (Table 1) 
• Good loans, which are both productive and are being serviced; 
• Bad loans, which are delinquent, and also where the prospective earnings stream (viabil-
ity) is questionable;
• Unproductive loans, which are still performing, but are similarly not viable4;  
• Temporarily distressed loans or strategic defaults.  This includes either debts that are 
3 The former is essentially an assessment of solvency or positive net worth, the latter an assessment of delinquency 
and forbearance, which has been defined by the European Banking Authority (EBA). 
4 An interesting example here is household debt in the Netherlands, where despite a big house price correction and 
a big income drop, the level of NPLs has remained low. The European Commission, in its last country report for 
the Netherlands alludes to strict insolvency rules as a possible explanation, which effectively force households to 
comply with bank payments, even though defaults arise elsewhere, such as in health payments (European Com-
mission, 2016).
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temporarily in distress but could return to being performing5 or loans that are non-per-
forming by choice. The latter are the result of moral hazard where debtors choose not to 
pay back debt even when economically feasible. This loan segment is significant in a num-
ber of euro-area countries, in many cases because of the anticipation that a restructuring 
solution would become widely available6. 
Table 1:  Loans: viability and servicing
Viable Non-viable
Performing Good loans Unproductive loans
Non-performing
Temporarily distressed or
‘Strategic’ defaults
Bad loans
Source: adapted from Bricongne et al (2016). 
Given these four categories, understanding debtors’ true ability to pay back debts and to 
restructure appropriately is crucial. Since 2013, the European Banking Authority standards 
on asset quality have provided uniform definitions of the state of a borrower’s performance 
relative to its creditors. Financial regulators are now beginning to combine this with a parallel 
assessment of the severity of borrowers’ debt distress, and their potential non-viability. New 
accounting standards that will come into force in 2018 will require a more forward-looking 
assessment of loan quality. In effect, accounting for loan quality (evident in NPL figures) will 
be de-linked from the evolution of value corrections on loans (impairments). 
Once banks begin to take a deeper look at borrowers’ financial health, this might have to 
recognise that certain companies are irredeemably insolvent, and no amount of restructuring 
will return them to viability. From the perspective of financial sector soundness, and also 
of growth prospects, such companies should be cut off from credit and banks should work 
towards the early and efficient liquidation of assets and collateral. 
In several EU states insolvency laws and foreclosure rules do not allow such a resolution 
(‘foreclosure’). A long history of continued lending to ‘zombie’ firms has tied up meagre bank 
capital, starved other sectors of access to credit and depressed productivity growth in the 
economy more widely7. 
2 NPL resolution and debt restructuring 
during European crises 
Even before the most recent European crisis, a number of European countries experi-
enced systemic distress in terms of private debt and bank NPLs. Two countries illustrate how 
addressing the poor quality of banks’ assets needs to proceed in tandem with restructuring of 
private sector debt. 
• Following a property market collapse, loan losses in Sweden in 1992 alone amounted to 
5 This would include those where re-defined loan terms have restored viability (even though supervisors would still 
count such forborne loans as non-performing). 
6 Asimakopoulos et al (2016) estimate that in Greece one out of six firms with non-performing loans are aiming at 
strategic default.
7 For instance, in analysis covering 2012 for Greece PwC (2015) suggested that 25 per cent of loans should be written 
off, and a further 16 per cent would require restructuring. 
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3.8 percent of GDP, and NPLs to 11 percent, both primarily related to commercial real es-
tate and mortgages. Bank lending contracted by over 26 percent between 1990 and 1995. 
Recovery took ten years (Sandal, 2004). However, Sweden also stands out for having used 
a state-owned bad bank to deal successfully with a large overhang of distressed property 
loans. Following the capital injection in 1991, most bad assets from state-owned Nord-
banken, the country’s third largest bank, were transferred into a separate asset manage-
ment company (AMC), Securum. A similar asset management company was set up for a 
much smaller private bank, and this was subsequently merged into Securum. The purpose 
of the two AMCs was to enable a clean break for the healthy part of the banking system, 
and to let specialists focus on restructuring and recovery of maximum value. A key ele-
ment in the success of these bad-bank structures was that the government transferred to 
them only a relatively well-defined asset class of large commercial real estate exposures. 
Specialist restructuring expertise was required for these assets, but sensitive political dis-
cussions, such as in corporate restructuring, could be avoided. Professional management, 
political independence, and appropriate funding contributed to success. The recovery 
of the economy from 1994 and then in real estate markets was of course crucial in this 
regard. In the end, Securum sold or restructured all assets within five years. 
• Latvia experienced a dramatic boom-bust cycle in the 2008-09 global crisis, with an 
overall GDP contraction of 18 percent, the largest of any emerging market. NPLs peaked at 
22 percent for firms, and about 20 percent for households. Nearly 44 percent of corporate 
credit was in foreign currency, meaning that maintaining the peg throughout the very 
painful internal devaluation period prevented a more serious balance sheet recession. 
Even though the largely Nordic-owned bank subsidiaries were the principal culprits be-
hind the excessive pre-crisis credit inflows, they were also instrumental in the successful 
workout effort that followed. Blanchard et al (2013) estimate that between early 2010 and 
mid-2013, one third of the Latvian stock of loans was restructured by the banks, and only 
about 7 percent written off. The experience of the Nordic banking crisis clearly shaped the 
engagement of the parent banks. Loan workout was centralised within the banks, or sepa-
rate asset management companies were set up. Provisioning levels were maintained even 
as NPL levels quickly rose, and the subsidiaries were recapitalised repeatedly by their 
parents. Most voluntary debt workouts were designed on the basis of relatively efficient 
out-of-court restructuring guidelines, typically led by a single bank, which could ultimate-
ly apply fairly efficient foreclosure procedures. The courts managed a smaller number of 
restructurings, though this option was considerably less attractive (Erbenova et al, 2011).
Sweden’s and Latvia’s experiences underline that private debt restructuring is part and 
parcel of recovery from a banking crisis. Both countries succeeded by making specialist 
restructuring expertise available, in an asset management company in the case of Sweden, 
or in relatively experienced and well-capitalised cross-border bank groups in Latvia and 
elsewhere in the Baltics. In the case of Parex, the only significant local bank in Latvia, state 
ownership of a separate bad bank became necessary. These workout efforts succeeded rela-
tively quickly within efficient legal frameworks, and, at least in Sweden, with the assistance of 
capable courts and related services. 
By contrast, structural reforms to facilitate debt restructuring in the euro-area crisis coun-
tries have been piecemeal. Ireland, Slovenia, Spain and Portugal have seen tangible reduc-
tions in the private debt ratio (Table 2). But debt reductions have been miniscule in Greece, 
Cyprus and Italy. Strikingly they are also critically high, and near their peaks, in the Nether-
lands, France and Austria. It is far from clear whether these further debt reductions can take 
place in the absence of well-developed frameworks for debt restructuring. 
Ireland, Slovenia and Spain are the only euro-area countries with asset management 
companies that cover several distressed banks (Germany and Austria are among those with 
institution-specific bad banks). The Irish, Slovenian and Spanish AMCs had a meaningful 
impact in terms of creating markets for distressed loans within their respective countries. 
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Ireland and Spain were among the most active secondary markets in Europe in 2016, with 
the Irish AMC, Nama, the most active seller8. Crucially, these bad banks also centralised debt 
restructuring, in particular of large distressed enterprises and real estate exposures. Loan 
servicing companies are an essential precondition for attracting investors into distressed debt 
(investors would typically sub-contract the servicing of borrowers). These companies were 
nurtured by the bad banks, but this sector has faced significant obstacles elsewhere, often 
arising from national restrictions on the transfer of loan titles (ECB, 2016). 
Despite the relative successes in Spain and Ireland, the ‘troika’ programmes in Greece, 
Cyprus and Portugal did not contemplate the setting-up of AMCs, despite significant pro-
gramme funds devoted to the recapitalisation of banks in Greece and Cyprus. This was 
because of the very complex frameworks for restructuring and insolvency, and the complexity 
of the various asset classes, spanning residential loans, SMEs and larger enterprises. Two 
factors have complicated the establishment of AMCs in Europe: starting in 2009, Eurostat put 
in place guidance under which most asset management companies would be considered part 
of the public sector and therefore subject to EU fiscal rules (Gandrud and Hallerberg, 2014). 
In addition, since 2015 when the EU’s new framework for bank resolution came into effect, 
public ownership of asset management companies has become more complicated because it 
could potentially lead to a ‘bail-in’ of certain creditors. 
Legal reforms have progressed in a number of the euro-area crisis countries, though 
restructuring solutions are generally held back by slow processes in the courts. In Italy, for 
instance, insolvency proceedings take on average more than six years (ECB, 2016). ECB 
country assessments point out that the number of foreclosures is generally limited. In Greece, 
corporate insolvency procedures remain lengthy and the system offers few incentives for early 
restructuring. The ECB assessment found a de-facto unlimited stay on enforcement against 
individual borrowers, which has encouraged large-scale strategic defaults. In Italy, enforce-
ment is also notoriously lengthy, though three laws adopted in 2015 and 2016 have attempted 
to shorten this. Spain since 2013 has benefitted from an out-of-court restructuring procedure 
for SMEs, with restructuring facilitated by professional mediators. This has been subsequently 
extended to consumers.
Box 1: Reforms aimed at debt reduction in Spain, Ireland and Slovenia
Between 2012 and 2014 Spain utilised €40 billion out of a €100 billion euro-area financial 
sector programme to recapitalise and consolidate its municipal banks (cajas), following 
the earlier real estate bubble. The transfer of distressed mortgages into Sareb, the central 
asset management company, was compulsory for those banks that received public capital 
injections. This programme succeeded in stabilising the financial sector. By end-2015, the 
total private debt ratio still stood at 154 percent of GDP, the bulk of which in the corporate 
sector. This represented a substantial drop since the peak of the crisis, not least because of 
the pick-up in growth. Deleveraging continues in the construction and real estate sectors, 
though banks increasingly fund new companies with good prospects.
Sareb acquired €106 billion in real estate assets (mostly residential, loans and actual 
property) at book value, subject to an average 52 percent ‘haircut’ (though recently had to 
substantially correct this value through additional provisions). As the central asset manage-
ment institution tasked with restructuring real estate assets, Sareb was a catalyst in building 
a market for distressed assets, and played a key role in attracting investors and servicers with 
restructuring expertise. It was given wide discretion to maximise value recovery during the 15 
years of its lifetime (Medina Cas and Peresa, 2016, and EU Commission, 2016). Cumulative 
8 Deloitte: Deleveraging Europe (2017). These rankings refer to the entire secondary loan market, where so-called 
‘non-core’ portfolios are an important component. Also, this market is dominated by commercial and residential 
real estate portfolios, while SME and corporate assets are still a minor component. 
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losses over the four years of its operation have been € 750 million. 
Legal changes in the years since the crisis substantially expanded the potential scope of 
both in-court and out-of-court arrangements. Pre-pack procedures exist for both corporate 
and individual borrowers. A code of conduct guides lenders in dealing with insolvent house-
holds, and the number of foreclosures has been very small (ECB, 2016). 
Similarly to Spain, Ireland’s central asset management agency, Nama, was instrumental 
in NPL resolution, which focused on distressed loans to property developers. Nama was set 
up in 2009 to pool distressed commercial property assets from the six banks that had benefit-
ed from a blanket guarantee and subsequent public capital injections. Nama’s portfolio was 
considerably larger than that of Sareb, accounting for over 18 percent of GDP, though this also 
comprised large commercial real estate assets that Irish property developers had acquired in 
the UK and elsewhere in Europe. The central bank also set targets for banks to reduce mort-
gage arrears. Importantly, banks were to propose sustainable modified loan terms to custom-
ers, unless the customer had declared bankruptcy based on the revised personal insolvency 
law (which specified alternative paths to resolution, and shortened the debt discharge from 
12 to ultimately only one year). Like in Spain, the number of foreclosures on households has 
been very low, and the various legal means to restore households and enterprises to viability 
remain underutilised. By end-2015, the private debt ratio stood at 243 percent of GDP (ex-
cluding the substantial foreign-owned sector), the second highest in the euro area.
The NPL crisis in Slovenia was primarily one of enterprises, not of households. Excess 
corporate debt emerged in the pre-crisis years when largely state-owned banks funded them-
selves in European wholesale markets, a source that dried up abruptly in 2009, and exposed 
the unsustainable debts of an increasingly uncompetitive and poorly managed corporate 
sector. The stress test of the country’s principal banks, and their subsequent recapitalisation 
by the state in late 2013, provided the motivation for a more comprehensive strategy on NPLs 
and excess debt. 
An official financial support programme was narrowly avoided, though the debt and NPL 
reduction was only partially successful. The 2013 revision of the insolvency law, and the later 
guidelines for multi-creditor restructuring were close to best practice. However, the govern-
ment strategy was undermined by the essentially unchanged governance of the two largest 
state-owned banks, which did not actively participate in the restructuring. Also the newly 
established bad bank did not have full political support for controversial restructuring of large 
distressed enterprises. Finally, a lack of expertise and capacity in the courts and among pri-
vate insolvency professionals frustrated many restructurings and resulted in lengthy proceed-
ings. Total private debt fell from its peak in 2009 to about 87 percent of GDP in 2015, though 
it remained heavily concentrated in a small number of large enterprises. Given the preoccu-
pation of domestic banks with the NPL workout, companies in the tradable sector, which are 
mainly profitable, have increasingly turned to cross-border borrowing.  
3 Policy initiatives and their coordination 
Previous NPL and debt crises show how good bank supervision and restructuring needs to be 
supported by structural reforms that return private borrowers to viability. From this experi-
ence we identify four key issues that need to be addressed to overcome Europe’s high private 
debts. Some warrant coordinated policies within the EU or euro area, others depend only on 
national reforms. 
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Early bank restructuring and recapitalisation to enable banks to actively support debt 
restructuring. 
Once banks’ loss absorption capacities are bolstered through early capital injections, banks 
can sustain further impairments and write-offs. These are inevitable whether the restructur-
ing solution is internal or whether executed by investors in the secondary loan markets. In 
other words, NPLs have not only eroded profitability but are also a symptom of thin capitali-
sation and the inability of banks to engage in debt restructuring that entails further write-offs. 
More determined NPL clean-up and debt restructuring will therefore need to be a key 
part of the broader effort to boost bank profitability. Low profitability is of course a problem 
that plagues banking sectors across the euro area, including in markets with better bank asset 
quality, and is also a consequence of a combination of low margins on lending, competi-
tion from non-bank financial firms and outdated business models (ESRB, 2016). There is a 
risk that banks will respond to greater supervisory pressure for NPL workout and additional 
provisions with a relaxation in risk standards for new lending or forbearance on existing but 
problematic loans. Greater scrutiny of banks’ NPL strategies will therefore require parallel 
efforts by supervisors to constrain credit risk, while allowing innovations in banks’ business 
models that are sustainable within the emerging EU-wide capital market. This is clearly a 
euro-area priority.
National frameworks for insolvency and early restructuring need to be reformed and 
adequately resourced.
All restructuring options ultimately rely on adequate capacity in the judicial system. In the 
United States, a system of specialist courts and judges is supported by experts within the 
courts, and private-sector insolvency practitioners. This results in a high degree of certainty in 
the timeline for insolvency proceedings (AFME, 2016). The EU has different legal traditions. 
Core elements of national insolvency regimes – for instance whether owners continue to 
manage the business while formal proceedings are underway, or how soon individuals may 
discharge their debts and make a fresh start – still differ widely. As a result there are marked 
differences in terms of what the frameworks in the EU achieve (Figure 3). Furthermore, 
several EU countries lack a proper framework for private debt restructuring ahead of formal 
insolvency proceedings. Such provisions are crucial to overcome coordination problems 
between lenders, for the awarding of temporary protection from enforcement, in securing the 
ongoing operation of the business and in protecting new financing provided on the basis of 
restructured finances and a new business plan. 
In November 2016 the Commission proposed a directive on preventive restructuring 
frameworks and insolvency procedures. This is a good start in addressing the diverging 
national practices. Common standards should provide a better framework for banks and 
investors. Standards should include limited stays on enforcement and rules for majority deci-
sions by lenders that bind all lenders (‘cram-down’). This directive, if adopted, would result 
in significant legal regime change in some key EU jurisdictions, for instance in establishing 
security for continuity in management or mandating protection for new financing.  
A supportive framework for the involvement of banks in restructuring and the workout 
of their NPLs would be a clear benefit of this directive. It may also support greater capital 
market integration. Given the cross-border implications of business insolvency for suppliers 
and downstream industries, there is a single market aspect to insolvency (AFME, 2016). The 
call for more uniform insolvency standards is particularly relevant within the euro area with 
its additional requirements of banking sector soundness and the need for a greater degree of 
financial-sector risk sharing (European Commission, 2015).
Where debt distress in SMEs is significant, countries will need to establish pre-defined 
restructuring solutions for such companies, as was done in Spain, for example. SMEs account 
for about 30 percent of the euro-area NPL stock, though their situation at present is not 
addressed in the EU directive. SMEs are especially affected by complex insolvency regimes 
and their restructuring cannot be executed by the banks on a case-by-case basis (IMF, 2015b). 
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A further challenge for countries will be to ensure adequate capacity in the restructuring 
professions to support their revised legal regimes. NPLs and debt distress in several countries, 
such as Greece, Portugal and Slovenia, are concentrated among larger companies. Here, 
corporate debt restructuring needs to go hand-in-hand with operational restructuring, and 
possibly capital infusions. In many cases, financial distress in firms is a reflection of a broader 
loss of strategic direction, or poor or outdated business plans. Operational restructuring, pos-
sibly with new ownership and replacement of management, needs to be part of the financial 
recovery of the firm. This is not normally a concern for macroeconomic policy or financial 
supervision, but might well emerge as a constraint in designing sustainable restructuring and 
tackling corporate NPL portfolios. The relevant restructuring expertise needs to be attracted 
from investors who are specialised in restructuring. New, and more senior, creditors are often 
needed, and new owners may need to implement a changed business strategy. 
Figure 3: Cost of insolvency proceedings and recovery rates in the euro area
Source: World Bank Doing Business 2017.
Governments will need to sustain temporary revenue shortfalls and write-offs of their 
own claims to support an economy-wide restructuring effort.
The public sector will need to participate in debt restructuring, alongside other banks, 
subjecting social security payments and other claims to a standstill and write down. Also, 
tax rules might need to be adapted as banks engage in restructuring or write-offs. In Italy, 
for instance, bank loan loss provisions were only made fully tax deductible from 2015. Public 
revenue will be foregone in the context of widespread corporate debt distress. Most options 
for debt restructuring – eg forgiveness, interest rate reductions, extensions of loan maturity, or 
merger of the distressed firm – give rise to taxable income on the side of the borrower. Giving 
such claims priority over other creditors in enforcement against a cash-constrained borrower 
in distress would accelerate insolvency. These immediate revenue shortfalls for the budget 
are likely to be insignificant in comparison to the long-term benefits in terms of growth and 
fiscal revenues that arise from comprehensive debt restructuring. Nevertheless, adapting 
national tax rules, and the facilitation of debt restructuring by fiscal authorities, will require 
flexibility under the common euro-area fiscal framework. Given the very limited fiscal space 
that exists, in particular in the countries with significant NPL problems, the issue remains 
politically difficult. 
Finally, countries with systemic NPL problems should consider establishing central 
asset management companies, and where necessary, the EU should clarify the bank 
resolution framework to facilitate this. 
European banks increasingly seek to divest distressed loan portfolios, especially now that 
NPL reduction targets will be set by the ECB. However, loan sales inherently suffer from two 
market failures. First, the bank as the seller that originated the loan and previously oversaw its 
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servicing has access to a far greater level of information than the typically uninformed buyer 
(ECB, 2016). The AMC addresses this by establishing uniform valuation principles, and ensur-
ing quality in loan documentation. A second market failure arises through the illiquid market 
for distressed debt in which there is the risk of a wide divergence between market valuations 
of assets offered for sale, and the long term economic value that will ultimately be realised. 
Here the AMC acts as a market maker, ie avoiding the risk of a ‘fire sale’. 
Crucially, AMCs also address the inherent skills shortage, and overcome coordination 
problems in defining restructuring solutions that will ultimately realise long term economic 
value. The experiences with Sareb in Spain and Nama in Ireland underline this potentially 
catalytic effect of asset management companies, though in both the Irish and Spanish cases 
this came on the back of a comprehensive bank restructuring and recapitalisation effort, and 
both entities dealt with relatively homogeneous asset classes. SMEs (which dominate Italian 
NPL portfolios) will require the ongoing involvement of banks, and larger corporates (as in 
Portugal) might require both a central asset management company and specialist investors. 
Public involvement in ownership and funding of such institutions is inevitable, at least 
initially. This is now complicated by the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) 
under which the transfer of assets above market prices to a public AMC could potentially lead 
to bail-in of certain creditors. 
The discussion around a European AMC has nevertheless now revived. Constâncio (2017), 
for instance, called for a “blueprint” that would provide a clearer framework for asset transfers 
to AMCs that are permissible under the BRRD. There have been more ambitious proposals for 
an EU-wide AMC (Haben and Quagliariello, 2017). However, since the first proposals for such 
an institution, countries have proceeded at different speeds, and the benefits that could arise 
from the creation of such a jointly-owned institution have diminished.
4 Conclusions: more assertive bank 
supervision will need to be complemented 
by debt deleveraging strategies
In March 2017 the ECB issued guidelines on the management of NPL portfolios in the banks 
that are under its supervision. This was a much needed, and overdue, initiative to tackle lega-
cy assets in the euro-area banking system and to prevent their re-emergence. However, as we 
have shown, in the absence of other supporting policies and reforms aimed at deleveraging, 
greater pressure by bank supervisors will likely be ineffectual and could be counterproduc-
tive. The low-interest rate environment provides a window of opportunity to accelerate this 
broader debt reduction but it might not be there for much longer.
This pressure by supervisors needs to be focused on seven high NPL countries: Greece and 
Cyprus where NPLs and private debt remain near their peaks; Portugal and Slovenia where 
the workout of corporate and SME NPLs will be protracted; Spain and Ireland with significant 
remaining problems in their mortgage sectors despite the good work of their respective bad 
banks; and Italy with almost 30 percent of the euro-area NPL stock. 
In developing a comprehensive strategy to finally tackle legacy assets there is a clear need 
to strengthen four key policy areas. First and foremost, bank recapitalisation should enable 
banks to make further provisions and participate in restructuring and loan sales or to write 
off ultimately unviable exposures. Spain and Ireland demonstrated how essential adequate 
capital coverage and consolidation are in this process. Second, further legal reform should be 
supported by adequate restructuring capacity within the banks and elsewhere in the private 
sector, including through the involvement of specialist restructuring investors. Third, fiscal 
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space should be allowed for the public sector to support debt restructuring. Finally, asset 
management companies that can overcome the various market failures in removing dis-
tressed assets from banks’ balance sheets are an essential part of financial infrastructure. The 
legal and budgetary basis for such AMCs should now be put in place, and implementation of 
the BRRD with regard to asset valuations should become more transparent. 
Above all, this agenda is one for national governments, which need to strengthen restruc-
turing frameworks and equip their banks to handle restructuring. But there is also a need for 
coordination within the euro area: in the implementation of the ECB NPL guidelines and the 
associated reduction targets; in the supervisory strategy that ushers in a return to bank prof-
itability; and in facilitating greater cross-border banking and financial integration. If nothing 
else, euro-area coordination is justified by the many distortionary effects that the common 
and still loose monetary policy has on companies with excessive debts. 
It is less straightforward to define a common agenda for the EU. The proposed EC directive 
might establish a baseline for restructuring regimes and insolvency frameworks but given 
the different legal traditions of EU countries there is unlikely to be complete consistency of 
national regimes. 
There have been three proposals for EU-level instruments that could support this NPL 
resolution. These are in decreasing order of political realism but increasing effectiveness: a 
NPL clearing house that would establish common standards for data quality in loan sales; a 
securitisation instrument at EU level that would provide a risk guarantee to senior tranches of 
NPL portfolios; and an EU-wide asset management company. 
We find an EU-wide bad bank is sensible in theory, though its start-up would be pro-
tracted because a political consensus would need to be built, valuation principles established, 
and expertise hired, even if an existing EU institutions such as the EIB were to take on this 
role. Such a bad bank would have had great value-added at the peak of the NPL crisis in the 
euro area. Since then countries have advanced at different speeds, reducing the benefits that 
such a jointly-owned institution could bring. Italy and Portugal will continue to examine 
new strategies for distressed bank assets, and the BRRD should not act as a disincentive for a 
sensible public involvement.
Even in the absence of common institutions, much could be done to make sure that bank 
supervision is properly supported by national legal frameworks and debt reduction strate-
gies. Above all, national political ownership is essential for a strategy that will entail difficult 
restructuring decisions within firms, and across industries.
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